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This paper argues that general skills and the varieties of subject-specific discourse are both impor-
tant for teaching, learning and practising critical thinking. The former is important because it
outlines the principles of good reasoning simpliciter (what constitutes sound reasoning patterns,
invalid inferences, and so on). The latter is important because it outlines how the general principles
are used and deployed in the service of ‘academic tribes’. Because critical thinking skills are—in
part, at least—general skills, they can be applied to all disciplines and subject-matter indiscrimi-
nately. General skills can help us assess reasoning independently of the vagaries of the linguistic
discourse we express arguments in. The paper looks at the debate between the ‘specifists’—those
who stress the importance of critical thinking understood as a subject-specific discourse—and the
‘generalists’—those that stress the importance of critical thinking understood independently of
disciplinary context. The paper suggests that the ‘debate’ between the specifists and the generalists
amounts to a fallacy of the false alternative, and presents a combinatory-‘infusion’ approach to
critical thinking.
Introduction
Tim Moore’s recent paper on the critical thinking debate between the ‘generalists’ and
the ‘specifists’ is a timely piece, especially given the moves to introduce graduate skill
assessment tests that incorporate ‘critical thinking’ (Moore, 2004). This paper argues
that, while cautious and provisional in his approach, Moore ultimately sides with the
specifists. The paper claims that there is more to the case for the generalist than Moore
suggests. However, unlike Moore, I am not intending to adjudicate between the rival
positions, but to suggest that they are complementary and alternative means to
understanding ‘critical thinking’.
*The Teaching and Learning Unit, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, University of Melbourne,
Victoria 3010, Australia. Email: wmdavies@unimelb.edu.au
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180 W. M. Davies
The generalists and the specifists
The ‘generalists’ are described by Moore as those for whom critical thinking is a univer-
sal, general skill. The ‘specifists’ are those for whom critical thinking ‘is best conceived
of as only a loose category taking in diverse modes of thought’ (Moore, 2004, p. 4).
Moore cites Robert Ennis (Ennis, 1985, 1987, 1992, 1997) as a defender of the former
position and John McPeck as a defender of the latter position (McPeck, 1981, 1990,
1992). As we shall see, on balance, Moore sides with McPeck and argues for the impor-
tance of subject-specific skills and a genre-specific approach to critical thinking.
The generalist–specifist fallacy
Moore’s argument—indeed, the whole ‘debate’ between the generalists and the speci-
fists—involves a fallacy of the false alternative.  This is not a new response to the debate.
In fact, it has already been mentioned in relation to McPeck’s account—on which
Moore relies (Quinn, 1994). In Moore’s case, the fallacy can be seen in a revealing
passage: 
[D]espite the importance attached to the skill of critical thinking, and despite assurances
by many universities that it is imparted to students as a matter of course, a number of unre-
solved questions remain. Central to these is the issue of whether critical thinking is in fact a
universal ‘generic skill’ able to be applied invariably to the situation at hand, or whether it is best
conceived as only a loose category taking in diverse modes of thought. And related to this
conceptual issue is a central pedagogical question: is it best for our undergraduate students to
be taught about critical thinking as a subject of study in itself, or should it be handled within the
context of students’ study in the disciplines? (Moore, 2004, p. 4, italics added)
Moore wants us to accept here that critical thinking should be either  thought of as a
universal ‘generic’ skill or  a ‘loose category taking in diverse modes of thought’—that
is, a subject-specific category, but not both.  He does seem to be opting for an ‘exclu-
sive’ sense of ‘or’ regarding the generalist and specifist debate. In parallel, he wishes
us to accept that students should be either  taught about critical thinking ‘as a subject
of study in itself’, or  through disciplinary studies, but not both.  We can see that this is
so, because in the article alternative positions are not offered; combined approaches
are not raised as worth considering. This false dilemma is similar, note, to other
fallacies, such as: 
Either we increase military support to El Salvador or we cut off funds altogether. Therefore
we must choose between caving in to communism and supporting a brutal tyranny.
There is plenty of support for the idea that critical thinking should be seen both as a
general skill and as diverse modes of thought that are particular to the disciplines
concerned. This ‘infusion’ approach has been adopted elsewhere (Ennis, 1987;
Swartz & Perkins, 1989; Swartz & Parks, 1994; Melville Jones, 1999; Ikuenobe,
2001; Reed & Kromrey, 2001).
Ikuenobe, for example, argues persuasively for a position where the generalist
approach can be combined with the requirements of specific contexts in a ‘develop-
mental’ approach to teaching critical reasoning. On Ikuenobe’s view, context-free
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Moore and critical thinking 181
principles of informal logic are ‘necessary but not sufficient’ for critical thinking
(Ikuenobe, 2001, p. 20). Ikuenobe makes the plausible point that an entirely context-
dependent ‘specifist’ view of critical thinking is ‘unsatisfactory’. While it is true that the
notion of what constitutes an acceptable premise and conclusion is discipline-specific,
‘it is necessary to have an objective set of rational standards that can be rationally agreed
on to unpack the notion of “reasonable inference”’ (Ikuenobe, 2001, p. 24). His
‘developmental’ procedure can be represented as a series of five stages (Table 1).
It is only at the fifth level—not specified in the table owing to its discipline-specific
nature—that general principles are applied to specific disciplinary contexts. Below
this level, general principles of critical reasoning are studied. This kind of model is
surely more intuitively reasonable—and arguably more pedagogically sound—than a
model that is entirely ‘specifist’ or ‘generalist’ in its approach.
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that an approach that ‘infuses’ general crit-
ical thinking skills into the context of a discipline—a ‘partial treatment’ approach—
results in measurably better performance than a ‘no treatment’ approach, but not
better performance than a ‘full treatment’ approach (i.e. a generalist critical thinking
Table 1. Ikuenobe’s (2001) developmental approach to teaching critical thinking
● Can understand concepts of argument, premise, conclusion, propositions 
(statements)
● Can identify statements from non-statements, and isolate premises and 
conclusions 
● Can distinguish argument from exposition, explanation, opinion, etc.
● Can construct a discourse that categorizes the above 
● Explain concept of ‘inference’ and evidence
● Understand and can articulate the basic principles of reasoning in terms of 
justification and the notion of inferential or evidential link
● Understand concepts of truth and validity, soundness and fallacy
● Can identify fallacies in inferences and explain why they are fallacious
● Can construct valid and fallacious inferences and can reflect on own arguments 
and avoid fallacies
● Can understand and explain different kinds of evidential and inferential 
relationships
● Can identify these relationships in different texts
● Can construct arguments in which they make relationships based on standard 
forms in decisions, actions, writing and speaking
● Can identify and construct modus ponens, disjunctive and hypothetical syllogisms, 
statistical and inductive generalisations
● Can identify the different argument structures and their forms
● Can articulate or explain the principles underlying each of the argument 
structure types
● Can analyse the argument types using truth tables and/or Venn diagrams
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182 W. M. Davies
approach in the guise of informal logic classes). Solon has noted, in two separate stud-
ies, a substantial rise in critical thinking competence as measured in a Cornell Z- test
after a study comparing pre- and post-tests of three groups of students: one receiving
only general critical thinking instruction (the full-treatment group); another receiving
critical thinking instruction in the context of psychology classes (the partial treatment
group) and a third group—a class in rhetoric—receiving no instruction at all (the no
treatment group) (Solon, 2001, 2003).
The full-treatment group had 40 hours of classroom instruction and over 80 hours
of homework exercises. Interestingly, this group showed the greatest improvement in
critical thinking of the other two groups. The partial treatment group had 10 hours of
class time intervention and the control group had none at all. Solon carefully elimi-
nated from the groups individuals who may have had prior experience or training in
‘logic’ or critical thinking-related subjects (statistics, research methods) or who were
involved in debating, investigative journalism or detective work. Solon also subjected
the students in the three groups to a battery of tests to ensure that students in the
three groups were not too dissimilar in terms of initial abilities. The grade point
averages of each group of students were similar (2.79, 2.86 and 2.73 respectively),
they performed similarly on an ASSET reading test (for university admission) and
there were no noticeable differences in terms of gender or ethnic mix. Crucially,
students in each of the groups performed similarly in the pre-test using the Cornell Z
(Critical thinking group M = 43.88; Psychology group, M = 43.75; Rhetoric group,
M = 44.13). The results of the second study are reproduced in Table 2.
Such results are suggestive of the value of an integrated, combinatory ‘infusion’
approach to teaching generalist skills in the context of the disciplines. They are not
an argument for an entirely ‘specifist’ approach. (Interestingly, the results also offer
support to the value of a ‘generalist’ approach by itself.) The results indicate that the
more critical thinking instruction—in terms of general principles infused into subject
content—the greater the benefit  in terms of measurable results. Solon’s paper is the
first of its kind to attempt a controlled study of this kind, and further work in this
area—replicating the study in a variety of disciplinary contexts—would be of great
interest.
Recent work in Australia involving first-year undergraduate students at the
University of Melbourne over a two-year period (2002–3) involved conducting pre
Table 2. Results comparing critical thinking abilities in mixed classes
Pre-test 
Cornell Z
Post-test 
Cornell Z Group contrast
Mean 
difference
Critical 
value
Level of 
significance
Effect 
size
Critical thinking
n = 32
43.88
SD: 4.51
30.32
SD: 3.67
CT vs Rhetoric 
(post)
7.05 4.28
6.30
Sig p < 0.05
Sig p < 0.01
d = 1.19
Psychology
n = 30
43.75
SD: 5.17
26.88
SD: 4.24
CT vs Psych 
(post)
3.45 3.39 Sig p < 0.05 d = 0.80
Rhetoric
n = 33
44.13
SD: 5.19
23.27
SD: 5.51
Psych (post) vs 
Rhetoric (post)
3.61 3.39 Sig p < 0.05 d = 0.69
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Moore and critical thinking 183
and post measures of informal reasoning using a standard measurement tool, the
California critical thinking skills test  (CCTST): (van Gelder et al., 2004). This partic-
ular critical thinking course involved the use of computer-supported diagramming
techniques to ‘map’ reasoning visually (see below, ‘Revisiting the teaching of critical
thinking’). This approach has led to standard deviation gains of 0.83 over the course
of a 12-week semester. This is a remarkable result. Clearly, improvements in critical
thinking skills can be made by teaching general reasoning skills. It would appear
Solon’s results are—to some degree at least—generalizable to the Australian context.
I am not suggesting here that general critical thinking skills need be taught in the
form of critical thinking or informal logic classes at universities (as is customarily
done). Traditionally, teaching syllogistic structures and logical terminology has been
seen as dry, overly abstract, irrelevant and impractical. As noted by others, this has
been the standard way in which critical thinking has been taught in Australia at
undergraduate level (Melville Jones, 1999). It may be that the generalist enterprise
has been right in its aims  but wrong in its pedagogical methods  to date and that there
are better ways to teach critical thinking (see below, ‘Revisiting the teaching of critical
thinking’).
Critical thinking as a ‘form of discourse’
Moore’s fallacy is not as explicit—nor as dangerous—as the ‘El Salvador’ argument,
above. I would not want to suggest that it is. But Moore’s aim does appear to be to
subordinate our understanding of critical thinking as a ‘generalist’ skill to an under-
standing of critical thinking as a ‘specifist’ skill. Moore wants us to see generalist-style
critical thinking as itself a specific form of discourse  (as opposed to a general skill which
is universal to the human species that can be taught independently): 
What I want to suggest from the above analysis is that the discourse associated with gener-
alist critical thinking training … may be best thought of as not a general discourse at all,
but rather a quite specific one. (Moore, 2004, p. 13)
To be fair, Moore’s language here indicates a degree of tentativeness and cautiousness:
‘I want to suggest ’, ‘may be best thought of …’. The following passage makes his posi-
tion seem even more cautious: 
I do not wish to suggest that this type of discourse [generic, universal ‘critical thinking’
models] is not a valid one for our students to learn about, only that it is a mistake to see it
as the model for other discursive forms that they will need to engage with, both in their
studies, and later in their professional lives … [t]o do so would seem to be pedagogically
ill-conceived. (Moore, 2004, p. 13)
There appears to be a tension here. On the one hand, Moore wants to side with the
specifists. He does describe the generalist model as ‘pedagogically ill-conceived’. On
the other hand, he expresses caution in doing so. This ambivalence leads to his artic-
ulation of the issue in terms of the false dilemma given earlier. Not seeing this as a
fallacy, however, Moore takes a stand and ultimately—though cautiously—sides with
the specifists, noting the ‘positivist’ limitations of the generalist approach, its
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‘restrictiveness’, and its dangers in terms of limiting the possibility of dialogue and
‘other types of knowledge’: 
[A]s I have been arguing in this paper there would seem to be a danger in conceiving of
critical thinking in the essentially positivist terms of this [generalist] approach; that is, by
drawing on a number of general critical thinking heuristics, we can arrive at definitive and
final judgements about the rightness and wrongness of propositions, about the correctness
and incorrectness of solutions, and about the validity or lack thereof of ideas. … [T]his is
a far too restrictive notion of critical thinking practices, one that has the potential to limit
the possibility of dialogue and to close down the possibilities of other types of knowledge
and critique. (Moore, 2004, p. 13)
It seems fair, in the final analysis, to see Moore’s position as siding with the specifists.
However, there is a problem here. Any conclusion (tentative though it might be)
that the specifist thesis is more acceptable than the generalist thesis on the issue of
critical thinking will only follow if an exclusive sense of ‘or’ is assumed (and either  the
generalist thesis or the specifist thesis is supported, but not both ). As we have seen,
Moore himself is less than equivocal on this, and in places, wants to acknowledge the
importance of both the specifist and generalist theses. This conflict is fudged by call-
ing the generalist approach a ‘type of discourse’ in the second passage above.
This reasoning is flawed. The generalist approach demonstrably sees critical think-
ing as more than ‘a type of discourse’. As Moore notes correctly elsewhere, for the
generalist—and not the specifist—critical thinking is a ‘universal, general skill’ that
applies to ‘the correct assessing of statements’ (Ennis, 1962)—i.e. inference patterns
not linguistic genre. For the specifist it is a ‘loose category taking in diverse modes of
thought’ that are subject-specific. Moore seems to want to have his cake and eat it
too. He wants to use an ‘exclusive’ sense of ‘or’ and reject the generalist conception
in favour of the specifist conception, but in places he also wants to have an ‘inclusive’
sense of ‘or’ and keep the generalist conception as a form of discourse  among others.
This line of reasoning results in confusion. The solution to the ‘debate’, it seems to
me, is not to decide between the two at all, but to see each in terms of a developmental
approach similar to Ikuenobe.
Is the generalist thesis false?
Moore’s argument turns on an acknowledgement of the different ‘dimensions’ of
object, content  and register  in the selectively chosen samples given from academic
writing. Moore gives a detailed assessment of a range of texts from different disci-
plines. The examples Moore presents are reproduced in Appendix 1, and summa-
rized in a table that Moore also provides (see Moore, 2004, pp. 7–8).
All the examples are selected because they present different examples of ‘critical
thinking’ from different disciplines, and each evaluates a ‘set of ideas’ (Moore, 2004,
pp. 7–8). Moore claims that, because the object , content  and register  of the examples
are dissimilar, that this therefore casts the ‘generalist’ thesis into disrepute. Moore’s
argument can be expressed in the following hypothetical syllogism (I am paraphrasing
from Moore’s article):
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Moore’s argument
P1: If the generalist thesis is true, then examples of critical thinking from different
disciplines should be able to be assessed using general skills of critical thinking.
P2: Examples of critical thinking from different disciplines cannot be assessed using
general skills of critical thinking (the object, content and register are dissimilar for
each example).
C: Therefore, the generalist thesis is false.
This valid argument form—modus tollens  (or denial of the consequent)—provides
further, practical, support for Moore’s contention that: 
Universal general skills do not model the discursive forms that students have to engage
with (and ‘would seem to 
be pedagogically ill-conceived’) [Tantamount to: critical thinking skills are not universal
skills]. (Moore, 2004, p. 13)
However, I would submit that premise 2 of the above argument is false. To see why,
consider Moore’s claim that assessing texts 2 and 3 in terms of the ‘non-gradable’
terms of text 1, does not do justice to the evaluative criteria being employed in such
texts (see Appendix 1). Moore suggests that the terms in texts 2 and 3: ‘implausible’
and ‘ineffective’; ‘holistic’ and ‘vivid’—unlike the terms ‘true’ or ‘logical’ (which
might properly apply to text 1)—admit of gradable evaluation. It is possible to be
‘more or less plausible’, ‘more or less vivid’, and so on. Moore claims that, by
contrast, it is not possible to be ‘more or less true’. His point is that the evaluative
criteria of text 1—which is presented as a textual instance of the ‘generalist’ model of
‘critical thinking’—do not admit of ‘graded’ evaluation, and that therefore the
generalist thesis is inadequate as a means of understanding all kinds of ‘critical
thinking’. The evaluative criteria that apply to examples like text 1, do not apply to
texts 2 and 3, according to Moore.
However, this is a serious oversimplification of critical thinking as it is under-
stood—or should be understood—in the generalist model. The generalist thesis is not
restricted to the kinds of examples given in Moore’s text 1, even if they are the main
focus of Moore’s attack on generalization. Strictly speaking, the generalist thesis is
that understanding and application of rules of logical inference applied to statements
(and not simply the language specific to disciplinary areas) assists in the transmission
of the tools and principles of ‘critical thinking’ (i.e. these skills are not just taught by
means of the subject-specific genre of the disciplines alone). In other words, critical
thinking is more than ‘a type of discourse’.
It needs to be noted that syllogistic reasoning patterns, such as those provided in
text 1, are only one form  of critical thinking—one model of logic—on the generalist
model. Specifically, it is a form known as syllogistic logic (or Aristotelian logic)
(Smith, 2003). Modern forms of critical reasoning, however, also admit of many
alternative forms of logics—one of which is ‘fuzzy’ logic (Hajek, 2002). This form of
generalist logical system admits of a range of truth values in-between ‘true’ and ‘false’.
Propositions may be assigned degrees of truth  (truth values) which may be ‘absolutely
true’, ‘absolutely false’ or some intermediate  degree of truth. On this account, a
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proposition may in fact be more true  than another proposition. Other systems of logic
include: monotonic logics, paraconsistent logics, intuitionist logics, modal logics and
relevance logics. At best, Moore’s point applies only to the teaching of a certain form
of generalist ‘logic’ (namely, syllogistic logic), not others.
Leaving this aside, however, it is not clear—even using the form of generalist logic
that Moore is criticising—that his argument follows. For I would submit that texts 2
and 3 (given in Appendix 1) can be profitably discussed using the terms of general
logical principles. This does not mean, of course, that the texts cannot also be profit-
ably discussed in the terms of the linguistic discourse or subject-matter they are
expressed in; it means only that Moore’s argument that they cannot be adequately
rendered in the terms of the generalist thesis is false.
The argument of text 2, for example, can be rewritten as follows (once again, I am
paraphrasing from the example Moore gives): 
P1: If different models of reasoning constitute what he calls ‘subject areas’, and have
their own ‘categor[ies] of understanding’ and rules of reasoning, then the general
thinking skills approach is implausible.
P2: The different models of reasoning do have their own rules of reasoning [evidence for
this is presumably supplied elsewhere in McPeck’s book].
C: Therefore, the general thinking skills approach is implausible.
It would be clear from what has been argued so far that this argument is far from
adequate, even if the conclusion does follow validly from the premises (as it does
here). Even accepting that different disciplines have their own ‘rules of reasoning’ and
‘categories of understanding’ (whatever this might mean exactly), it need not be
accepted, without further argument, that the general thinking skills approach is
‘implausible’. Given this, premise 1, above, can be seen as a false premise. I have
suggested in this paper (see above, ‘The generalist–specifist fallacy’) that there is no
coherent reason why the terms of the generalist and the specifist positions cannot be
jointly marshalled as useful and practical ways of approaching an understanding of
‘critical thinking’. Indeed, they are best seen as complementary  methods. Assuming
otherwise commits the fallacy of the false alternative. I would suggest that McPeck’s
argument is a case of a valid argument with an unsound premise and a false conclu-
sion. That this is so can clearly be seen once the argument is unravelled from the slab
of disciplinary text that harbours it—a considerable advantage of the generalist
method.
The argument of text 3—a review of a study by M. Hopkins written by K.
Poethig—is admittedly more difficult to render in terms of the generalist model of
critical thinking and more susceptible to misinterpretation as it is taken out of
disciplinary context (which I acknowledge is also useful in understanding critical
thinking). However, the argument as it stands goes something like this (note that
there is a number of assumed premises and intermediate conclusions being
made): 
P1: A ‘holistic’ ethnography should attend to transnational linkages (or: if an ethnogra-
phy attends to transnational linkages then it is ‘holistic’). (Tacit, assumed premise.)
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P2: [The author’s] not attending to transnational linkages can be explained by the
primary focus on women and children and their kinship rituals.
P3: If an ethnography primarily focuses on women and children and their kinship
rituals, then the refugees will not express a political or national self-consciousness
(beyond being survivors of the Khmer Rouge).
P4: Hopkins’s study does focus primarily on women and children and their kinship rituals.
C1: Therefore, the refugees in Hopkins’s study do not express a political or national self-
consciousness (beyond being survivors of the Khmer Rouge) (from P3–P4).
P5: An ethnography that attends to transnational linkages would pay more attention to
political transitions in Cambodia.
P6: Hopkins’s study does not attend to political transitions in Cambodia (from P2)
C2: Therefore, Hopkins’s study does not attend to transnational linkages (tacit, unstated
conclusion, from P1–P3 and P5–P6).
P7: Given the profound shifts in Cambodia during the period of Hopkins’s research, a
study where the subjects express no political or national self-consciousness nor other
transnational linkages, is surprising (from P1–C2).
P8: The subjects in Hopkins’s study express no political or national self-consciousness
and other transnational linkages (from P3–C1 and P7).
C3: Hopkins’s study is surprising.
It would be easy enough to go on to establish Poethig’s main conclusion that
Hopkins’s study is not ‘holistic’—in premise 1 it is only established that if an ethnog-
raphy attends to transnational linkages, then it is holistic (nothing is established about
Hopkins’s study itself)—but I think the point being made here is already clear
enough. The generalist model of understanding critical thinking—in terms of infer-
ence patterns between statements—is quite capable of handling arguments expressed
in the language of the disciplines.
It might be argued that such a generalist approach is a blunt instrument and
captures few of the subtleties of the language used—e.g. in relation to the extent of
‘vividness’ of Hopkins’s study—but this is a slightly different point from the one
Moore is making. (Moore is intimating that because  it cannot capture ‘vividness’, it
therefore cannot capture the argument being made—and this clearly does not
follow.) At any rate, none of the linguistic subtleties impinge or influence the series
of inferences being made. A generalist approach does not require such linguistic
fineries as ‘most vivid’ to establish the patterns of inference in the argument.
Indeed, such things add little or nothing to the argument, qua pattern of inference,
though they might add something to the author’s attitude to the article being
reviewed, and the social context of the paper (Moore is right in stressing this point).
But it is unreasonable to expect that any one  approach to understanding critical
thinking will do the entire job (that is, both analysis of general inference patterns
and textual analysis). I am suggesting that both approaches—generalist and speci-
fist—are needed.
One of the major advantages of a generalist approach is that it allows inferences to
be made clearly and explicitly, so that they can be questioned and criticized. If I were
Hopkins, I would more easily be able to attack Poethig’s review from a reading of the
above ‘generalist”’ rendering, than I could from Poethig’s orginal text. Indeed, I
would be able to point to the premises of Poethig’s review that I disagree with, and
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establish the reliability of drawing the conclusion that he has. I would be easily able
to muster a counter-attack or reply.
However, I would not want to suggest that the generalist approach alone is a pana-
cea. It also has disadvantages. It is true that this approach alone does remove the
elegance of the prose by rendering it ‘bluntly’ as a series of inferences. But then again,
academic writing is not poetry. It is written to advance knowledge by means of
argument or evidence. Another disadvantage of such a rendering is that it can be done
badly in the wrong hands. It requires hard intellectual work, and prose is—by its very
nature—notoriously open-textured and vague (van Gelder, 2004). Different readers
bring different assumptions to the argument and construe it differently. This can lead
to renderings of the prose in quite different ways. (Note, however, this is also a
problem for the specifist  approach to critical reasoning which is based on the discourse
of the disciplines alone.)
Revisiting the teaching of critical thinking
The problems of interpreting text in prose can be overcome, I would suggest, not by
opting for a specifist  approach to critical thinking, but by investigating better ways to
render arguments using the generalist  approach. This work is being done here in
Australia. New forms of computer-supported diagramming techniques are advanc-
ing the representation of arguments (Monk, 2001; van Gelder, 2001, 2002).
Moore’s critique of the generalist method is, at best, a critique of traditional  ways of
teaching logic in critical thinking classes in Australian universities (and elsewhere).
His ‘text 1’ is a representative example of the way in which generic critical skills
were—and often still are—taught to undergraduates (a stock example, given in all
first-year logic classes, is the artificial and somewhat un-illuminating syllogism: All
men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal ). Such examples have
been a source of disquiet among the contemporary student body who are more
focused on immediate application to discipline-specific relevance and, ultimately,
career goals (Melville Jones, 1999). Theories of the classical syllogism, and
techniques of formal logic are of little use in real-world  reasoning (Ikuenobe, 2001;
van Gelder, 2002).
Fortunately, things have moved on from that approach to teaching critical thinking.
Now, in some courses, students are being taught how to identify and evaluate argu-
ments themselves—largely free from logician’s jargon—in discipline-specific contexts
using computer-supported diagramming techniques. The generic inferences are still
taught, but they are taught in a much more interesting way using more relevant
examples. A simple argument using the Reason!Able  software is given below. The
argument: Al Qaeda is not a state, so the US has not declared war on it  (something one
might expect to see in a ‘Letter to the editor’) is plotted, using the software, in easy-
to-follow, flowchart format. Premises are represented in boxes and the conclusion is
shown at the top of the flowchart. Implied premises are also shown. Together the
premises constitute the reason  or inference  made to reach the desired conclusion.
These premises are, in turn, supported by—on the one hand—‘common knowledge’
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(the box with people in it), and—no grounds at all (the question-mark box)—on the
other (Figure 1). The software also allows grounds for premises to be weighted with
differing degrees of plausibility that can be assigned numerically (van Gelder, 2002).
Arguments of any degree of complexity can be represented in this format and they
can be applied to any disciplinary context (the Austhink  group currently run seminars
for leading law firms, ASIO and major corporations).
Figure 1. The Reason!Able approach using computer-supported diagramming techniques (van Gelder, 2000)
Reassessing the specifist approach
Much is lost in the ‘fog’ of academic discourse in the disciplines. This is indeed a pity.
For it is on this discourse that the specifist relies. However, because genre-specific
writing is open-textured and sometimes vague, students can lose sight of the argu-
ments. Often students are not capable of understanding arguments being made
precisely because  they become lost in academic discourse (in very bad academic writ-
ing often there is no argument  being made, merely an assertion). I point to just one
example of textual ‘fog’ as a case in point: 
The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social
relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations
are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of tempo-
rality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory
that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the
contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound
up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.
Figure 1. The Reason!Able approach using computer-supported diagramming techniques (van 
Gelder, 2000)
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I am not suggesting, of course, that Moore’s paper falls into this category. Moore is
as keen on academic clarity as I am. I take issue with his argument, not his writing.
My point is that at the level of pedagogy, becoming lost in academic discourse—at the
expense of seeing patterns of inference in arguments—is unfortunate in the extreme.
At the level of what might be driving educational policy, it is a disaster. To see critical
thinking in the terms of the ‘specifist’ alone—to see: ‘the discourse associated with
generalist critical thinking training as not a general  discourse at all, but rather a quite
specific  one’ (Moore, 2004, p. 13), is to run the risk of plumping for the ‘fog’ of
disciplinary discourse over the clarity of generalist inference-making. (I am not
suggesting that all disciplinary language is ‘foggy’, though increasingly in some disci-
plines it is. And I am certainly not suggesting that Moore makes this mistake, only
that there is a danger of students  doing so.)
I would submit that unless  students are capable of ‘deconstructing’—and I use
this word in a non-technical and non-disciplinary sense—slabs of discourse into a
series of premises leading to a conclusion, it is not clear that they have learned
anything substantial about their subject (regardless of the subject-matter). Becom-
ing embroiled in the discourse of one’s discipline may have intrinsic merits, but
doing this to the exclusion  of understanding the patterns of general inference being
made is to lose one of the important aims of education; that is, to be able to apply
general critical thinking principles to any text under consideration (regardless of
subject-matter).
Conclusion
Moore’s conclusion from all this is a form of ‘qualified relativism’ about the enterprise
of critical thinking (Moore, 2004, p. 14). From the reasonable (indeed trivially true)
assumption that the linguistic discourses of the various disciplines are distinctive and
unique, and with the observation that students, by and large, move between linguistic
discourses readily without problems (a premise I would question), combined with his
earlier argument that the generalist thesis is inadequate (which I have criticized),
Moore claims that there are problems of drawing together in some intelligent way ‘the
homogeneity of the general with the pluralities of the particular’ (Moore, 2004,
p. 14). According to Moore, it is not easy to see how the generalist model of critical
thinking can ever capture the ‘loose and diverse modes of thought’ of the disciplines.
Hence, he sides with the specifists and a ‘qualified relativism’ of what constitutes crit-
ical thinking. Critical thinking is not a general facility, which (given suitable training)
we are all imbued with to a greater or lesser extent, but a ‘particularist’ facility to be
devolved to the linguistic discourse of the disciplines.
Given the preceding discussion, however, this ‘qualified relativist’ conclusion is a
non sequitur.  Critical thinking, as a general facility, can be applied to the forms of
discourse of the disciplines. I have used only deductive forms of reasoning in this
paper, but, of course. ‘critical thinking’ encompasses much more than this (Ennis,
1987). Moreover, as argued, there is no good reason to rule out a combinatory-‘infu-
sion’ approach whereby critical thinking is seen in terms of both general skills and
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particular skills used in the service of the disciplines (Ennis, 1997). The former is
important because it outlines the principles of good reasoning simpliciter  (what
constitutes sound reasoning patterns, invalid inferences, and so on). The latter is
important because it outlines how the general principles are used and deployed in the
service of ‘academic tribes’.
Recent work in critical thinking has been able to see past the false dilemma that
Moore has presented, and to accommodate the different notions of critical thinking
in a unified approach (Ikuenobe, 2001). Critical thinking is therefore more than
simply ‘a loose category taking in diverse modes of thought’ (Moore, 2004, p. 4).
There is nothing relativist—or ‘qualified relativist’—about it.
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Appendix 1. Moore’s examples
Text 3: Extract from anthropology review article: Poethig, K. (1998). Review: ‘Braving a new 
world: Cambodian refugees in an American city’ by Mary Carol Hopkins. American Anthropologist, 
100(1).
It is surprising that the refugees in Hopkins’s study express no political or national self-
consciousness beyond their now classic formulation as survivors of the Khmer Rouge. Should not 
a ‘holistic’ ethnography also attend to these transnational linkages, particularly given the profound 
shifts in Cambodia during the period of her research? This absence may be partly due to the fact 
that her time was spent primarily with women and teenagers, who might have paid less attention 
to political transitions in Cambodia. Indeed, Hopkins’s ethnography is the most vivid in sections 
dealing with women’s role in family life, particularly kinship relationships and rituals.
Text—synopsis Field Genre Rhetorical purpose
Text 1: Evaluation of syllogism Critical thinking Textbook Pedagogic
Text 2: Evaluation of educational 
approach
Critical thinking Monograph Expository
Text 3: Evaluation of Ethnographic 
study
 Anthropology Review Expository
Source: Moore (2004).
Text 1: Extract from ‘thinking’ textbook for students: Ruggiero, V. (2001). The art of thinking: A 
guide to critical and creative thought (p. 247). New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
Consider the following ARGUMENT:
All Mensa members are intelligent
Some goatherds are Mensa members
Therefore, all goatheards are intelligent.
It is true that all Mensa members are intelligent (at least in terms of the mental characteristics 
measured by intelligence tests). So it would be logical, even inescapable, to conclude that those 
goatherds that are Mensa members are intelligent. But the premise speaks only of some goatherds 
not all of them. So it would be improper to conclude that all of them are intelligent. Non-members 
may be positively brilliant, but too modest to celebrate their intellectual gifts, or they may be 
dumber than the animals that they tend. On the basis of what is given here, we simply cannot say.
Text 2: Extract from chapter on ‘critical thinking’: McPeck, J. (Ed.) (1990). Teaching critical 
thinking: Dialogue and dialectic (pp. 36–7). New York: Routledge; emphasis in original.
I am arguing that just as different rules of predication constitute different language games, so 
different models of reasoning constitute what we call ‘subject areas’. Each is a different ‘category 
of understanding’ (in a Wittgensteinian sense), and each has its own ‘rules’, as it were, of 
reasoning. That is what renders a general thinking skills approach implausible from a theoretical 
point of view, and ineffective from a practical point of view—at least so I submit.
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